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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s ruling in McCoy v. Louisiana1 is in many ways
problematic. This case dealt with a borderline-competent client waffling on
his version of events and presented the Court an opportunity to address
complex issues that frequently arise in similar capital cases.2 These
tremendously important issues include: client perjury, the duty of candor,
the rules of professional ethics, the right to withdraw, client autonomy,
borderline competency, and mental health.3 Despite these important issues,
the Court held a strategic concession of guilt by defense counsel was a
structural error worthy of retrial without the showing of any prejudice.4 The
Court favored client autonomy and set precedent that gives defendants a
constitutional right to insist their attorneys not concede guilt to any element
of a crime, whether facing overwhelming adverse evidence or for the
purpose of presentence mitigation.5
This Comment argues the Supreme Court and every applicable lower
court erred in finding Robert McCoy competent,6 thereby enabling his
execution.7 Due to McCoy’s behavior and mental state,8 he was not eligible
for the death penalty,9 and the Court should have remanded on the issue of
competency. Additionally, the Court should have considered the issues
mentioned above10 and given more deference to defense counsel’s strategic
concession of guilt in light of the State’s overwhelming evidence.11 Even if
the Court held the concession of guilt was improper, they should have then
applied the Strickland test12 and decided if the defendant suffered prejudice

1. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018).
2. See discussion infra Sections II–VI.
3. See discussion infra Sections II–VI. See generally McCoy, 138 S. Ct. 1500.
4. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511–12.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1506; State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535 (La. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018).
7. Cf. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (“Today, no State in the Union permits the
execution of the insane.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“[D]eath is not a suitable
punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.”).
8. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1513 (Alito, J., dissenting) (providing details regarding McCoy’s
actions and proposed “incredible and uncorroborated defense”).
9. See cases cited supra note 7.
10. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
11. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1510.
12. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (laying out the Strickland twopronged test to assess “[a] convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to
require reversal of a conviction or death sentence”).
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stemming from the concession.13 Lastly, this Comment will discuss some
of the issues faced by defense counsel when dealing with a perjurious or
borderline-competent client, including the lack of guidance from the
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct.14
II. HISTORY
The Sixth Amendment guarantees: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.”15 The right to assistance of counsel is a relatively new concept
because the norm throughout the seventeenth and part of the eighteenth
centuries was self-representation.16 The right to counsel stemmed from the
framers’ intent to allow defendants to ultimately “act in their own selfinterest, free of government intervention.”17 During the mid-eighteenth
century, however, defense counsel began to appear more frequently in court,
although they were prohibited from speaking to the jury.18 Given most
crimes were private in nature, defense counsel was only allowed to crossexamine witnesses and act “as a vessel through which defendants could
exercise their personal rights.”19 Defendants themselves were in charge of
essentially all other parts of a criminal trial, including “speaking on issues of
fact.”20
Defendant self-representation is no longer the norm due to the Supreme
Court’s shift in ideology, which began with landmark cases like Gideon v.

13. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511 (“To gain redress for attorney error, a defendant ordinarily
must show prejudice.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692)); see infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
14. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1507 (citation omitted) (“Even now, when most defendants choose
to be represented by counsel, an accused may insist upon representing herself—however
counterproductive that course may be.”); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975)
(demonstrating the Sixth Amendment’s assurances, which do not merely provide the accused with a
right to a defense but actually grant them the power to make their own personal defense); see also Erica
J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 1147, 1166 (2010) (“Although representation by counsel had become more common by the time
of the Revolution, self-representation remained the norm.”).
17. See Maeve Sullivan, Comment, McCoy v. Louisiana and the Perils of Client Control of the Defense,
96 DENV. L. REV. 733, 735 (2019) (discussing the very limited role of an attorney in the seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries).
18. Id. at 735.
19. See id. at 735–36 (discussing the limited role of an attorney in the mid-eighteenth century).
20. See id. (describing certain duties of defense counsel and the defendant).
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Wainwright.21 Gideon overturned the Court’s prior holding in Betts v. Brady,22
which only gave the right to counsel to defendants charged with federal
capital crimes such as rape or murder.23 Gideon was a landmark case in every
aspect because it interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as “so
fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that
it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”24
The Gideon Court held:
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for [them]. . . . Similarly, there are few defendants charged with
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare
and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may
not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but
it is in ours.25

The Court reasoned an indigent defendant is significantly disadvantaged
without the helping hand of counsel, and this right should not be limited to
capital offenses, but extended to any criminal prosecution where there is a
chance of significant jail time.26 The Gideon Court also emphasized the
importance of having competent defense counsel because of the difficulties

21. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963) (recognizing a constitutional right
to counsel is not limited to federal capital offenses but is also available to state court defendants).
22. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
23. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339. Contra Betts, 316 U.S. at 473 (holding the Fourteenth Amendment
did not strictly require appointing trial counsel to a defendant for every criminal offense).
24. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340–41 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465) (holding the right to counsel as a
fundamental right which must be given to a defendant who cannot afford to hire counsel for
themselves); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”).
25. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
26. See id. (making the Sixth Amendment right to counsel obligatory on the States); see also
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (recognizing the need for counsels’ help in maneuvering
through the criminal justice system); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“Because of
the vital importance of counsel’s assistance, this Court has held that, with certain exceptions, a person
accused of a federal or state crime has the right to have counsel appointed if retained counsel cannot
be obtained.” (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938))).
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of maneuvering through the justice system as a layperson.27 As
Justice Sutherland explained in Powell v. Alabama:28 “Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.”29
The Gideon and Powell Courts recognized that without an attorney’s help at
every step of the judicial process there is simply no just or fair way to convict
a criminal defendant.30 This is largely because, even if the accused were
innocent, she would not have the means to prove her innocence without an
attorney’s help.31
The Supreme Court subtly changed its ideology when the right to selfrepresentation was revitalized in Faretta v. California.32 Faretta concentrated
more on the text of the Constitution, which merely recognizes counsel as
an assistant and reasoned that an attorney should not be forced on an
unwilling defendant.33 The Faretta Court, in holding the Sixth Amendment
implies a right to self-representation rather than a practice of forcing counsel
on unwilling defendants in a criminal proceeding, favored autonomy and
relied on the roots of English legal history.34
In the 1980s, following Faretta, the Court further accentuated its shift
toward defendants’ rights in Jones v. Barnes.35 In Jones, the Supreme Court
held: counsel has the authority to make strategic decisions when defending
a client, but the client controls the objectives of the defense.36 Additionally,
27. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337–39, 344–45 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69) (overturning the
Court’s previous holding in Betts because of the Court’s realization that the refusal to appoint counsel
is offensive to the idea of fairness).
28. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
29. Id. at 69.
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”);
see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45 (deeming the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “fundamental”);
Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69 (recognizing the danger a lay defendant may encounter without help from
counsel in navigating the criminal justice system).
31. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69 (“Without [the help of counsel], though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”).
32. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817 (1975) (using a strict interpretation of the
Constitution to hold the Sixth Amendment guarantees “the assistance of counsel” and does not require
an attorney to be forced on an unwilling defendant).
33. See id. at 817, 820 (“We confront here a nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people
as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to
defend himself if he truly wants to do so.”).
34. Id. at 819–21.
35. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (affirming the defendant has the authority to
make many decisions regarding certain aspects of his case, including whether to represent himself).
36. See id. at 751 (“[T]he accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental
decisions regarding the case . . . .”); see also Brief for the Ethics Bureau at Yale as Amicus Curiae
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the Court emphasized: counsel does not have a duty to press every
nonfrivolous argument the client requests “if counsel, as a matter of
professional judgement, decides not to present those points.”37 The
Supreme Court “rationalized that these defined roles would afford counsel
sufficient flexibility in forming the defense, as experienced advocates are
often better equipped to determine which issues will offer the defendant the
greatest chance of success.”38
In 1984, the Supreme Court offered further protections for criminal
defendants in Strickland v. Washington.39 Strickland provided a mode of
recourse for defendants whose attorneys “fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.”40 Strickland’s two-pronged standard provides: if a
defendant can show (1) his attorney fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) as a result he was prejudiced, the defendant is
entitled to a new trial—or alternatively a new sentencing proceeding—on
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.41 The recourse provided
under Strickland is frequently raised on appeal in both state and federal
courts but hardly ever granted.42 To date, the Supreme Court has failed to

Supporting Petitioner at 4–5, McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (No. 16-8255) (“Nowhere
do the rules of ethics suggest that the prospect of false testimony entitles the lawyer to affirmatively
disparage his client’s case in court against his express wishes.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives
of representation . . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the
client will testify.”).
37. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 751 (explaining, while a defendant has the ultimate authority regarding
certain aspects of his case, he does not have a constitutional right to force appointed counsel to pursue
nonfrivolous claims).
38. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 737–38; see Jones, 463 U.S. at 751–52 (recognizing experienced
attorneys have long emphasized the importance of narrowing the scope of arguments and focusing on
a few key issues that are likely to succeed).
39. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
40. Id. at 688.
41. See id. at 687–88 (explaining the necessary components to support a defendant’s claim that
the court should reverse his conviction or death penalty on the basis that his counsel’s assistance was
defective).
42. See Meredith J. Duncan, “Lucky” Adnan Syed: Comprehensive Changes to Improve Criminal Defense
Lawyering and Better Protect Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1651, 1652–53 (2017)
(“[T]he failure rate of ineffective assistance claims does not accurately reflect the frequency with which
defendants receive unacceptable legal representation at trial.”); Victor E. Flango & Patricia McKenna,
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 31 CAL. W.L. REV. 237, 259 (1995) (demonstrating
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are granted at a rate of less than 1% in federal courts and less
than 10% in state courts); Nancy J. King, Essay, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE
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recognize the inadequacy of existing ineffective assistance of counsel
jurisprudence.43
The Supreme Court had yet another opportunity in McCoy to address how
to balance a client’s interest with the attorney’s interest in using his
professional judgment.44 McCoy represented the difficult position often met
by capital defense counsel dealing with a borderline-competent client facing
the most extreme criminal charges.45 This case was an excellent
opportunity for the Court to clear many ambiguities in capital cases,
especially cases involving a fundamental disagreement regarding trial
strategy and the concession of guilt.46
III. FACTS OF MCCOY V. LOUISIANA
On May 5, 2008, Christine Young and her husband, Willie Young, were
shot dead in their home in Bossier City, Louisiana.47 Christine’s grandson,
Gregory Colston—only a high school senior—was also shot and killed in
the same incident.48 After quick investigative work and cooperation
between the state and federal police, Robert McCoy (“McCoy”) was arrested
and charged with three counts of first-degree murder.49 On July 1, 2008,
the State of Louisiana “gave its notice of intent to seek the death penalty
against [McCoy].”50
The physical and circumstantial evidence obtained by the State of
Louisiana was overwhelming.51 First, the State had police dashboard
footage of McCoy fleeing the scene of the crime in his car, a white Kia
registered to him and the daughter of the victims, Yolonda Colston.52
L.J. 2428, 2431 (2013) (emphasis added) (describing “the notoriously low rate of relief in federal habeas
[claims,] . . . [stating] less than 1% of noncapital habeas petitions were granted for any claim”).
43. Duncan, supra note 42, at 1653.
44. See generally McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (avoiding modification of the
existing approach to defendant autonomy).
45. See discussion infra Section V.B.
46. See discussion infra Part VI.
47. State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 541 (La. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 541–44 (describing the manhunt for McCoy involving local police, the U.S.
Marshals, and the FBI resulting in his arrest and subsequent indictment for capital murder).
50. Id. at 544.
51. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1513 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The evidence
against [McCoy] was truly ‘overwhelming,’ as the Louisiana Supreme Court aptly noted.” (citing McCoy,
218 So. 3d at 565)).
52. See McCoy, 218 So. 3d at 542 (“Detective Humphrey cautioned the first responders to be on
the lookout for a white four-door Kia, which he believed was driven by Robert McCoy.”).
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Second, Yolonda had separated from McCoy earlier that spring and was in
protective custody after an incident of domestic abuse.53 Next, the police
received a distressed 911 call from one of the victims, in which she
screamed: “She ain’t here, Robert [McCoy] . . . I don’t know where she is.
The detectives have her. Talk to the detectives. She ain’t in there, Robert
[McCoy].”54 A gunshot then rang out and the call disconnected.55 The
phone used to place the 911 call was later found inside the white Kia McCoy
abandoned during the police chase.56 Also inside the Kia was ammunition
for the gun used to kill the victims and a receipt documenting an
ammunition purchase earlier that day. 57 The State obtained security camera
footage from Walmart, showing McCoy purchasing the ammunition.58
Further, the State had cell phone records placing McCoy in Bossier City on
the day of the murders, negating his assertion of being out of state when the
murders occurred.59 The next piece of damning evidence obtained by the
State was the murder weapon, which officers found on McCoy at the time
of his arrest; the State ran a ballistics test on the weapon, confirming it was
the same gun that killed the three victims.60 The gun, bullets, and
ammunition found in the white Kia were identical to the bullet casings
found at the scene of the crime.61

53. See id. at 541 (footnote omitted) (“Yolanda Colston[] had separated from [McCoy] earlier in
the [s]pring of 2008 and following an incident of domestic abuse battery in April 2008. . . . Yolanda
and her infant daughter had gone into protective custody out-of-state, and a warrant was issued, on
April 16, 2008, for [McCoy’s] arrest for aggravated battery . . . .”).
54. Id. at 541–42.
55. Id. at 542.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 542, 544 n.8 (“Also found in the center console of the abandoned Kia was a
Walmart bag with a box of .380 caliber ammunition. Inside the Walmart bag was a cash receipt from
earlier that same day . . . for the purchase of the ammunition.”).
58. See id. (footnote omitted) (“The police obtained video surveillance footage from Walmart,
generated at the time of the purchase on the receipt, which showed an individual matching the
defendant’s physical description purchasing ammunition while wearing a black ‘do-rag’ on []his head.”).
59. See id. at 541, 549 n.15 (“[McCoy’s] cell phone records indicated that he returned to Bossier
City on or about May 4, 2008, as calls were initiated from [McCoy’s] cell phone in Bossier and Caddo
Parishes on the day of, and the day after, the murders.”).
60. See id. at 543–44, 544 n.8 (“[T]he bullet that killed Willie Young, which was removed from
his brain during autopsy, was fired from [the gun], and all four cartridge casings found at the scene
at 19 Grace Lane were conclusively determined to have been fired from [the gun].”).
61. Id. at 544 n.8.
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Despite this evidence, McCoy insisted he was innocent and was not in
Louisiana at the time of the murders.62 Instead, McCoy swore corrupt
police shot the victims when a drug deal went sour, and the government was
trying to frame him for the murders.63 McCoy was certain the police were
involved in a massive drug ring conspiracy, which included the federal
government, his defense attorney, and even the presiding judge.64
As the Supreme Court noted:
Despite all this evidence, [McCoy], who had been found competent to stand
trial and had refused to plead guilty by reason of insanity, insisted that he did
not kill the victims. [McCoy] claimed that the victims were killed by the local
police and that he had been framed by a farflung conspiracy of state and
federal officials, reaching from Louisiana to Idaho. [McCoy] believed that
even his attorney and the trial judge had joined the plot.65

When it came time for trial, McCoy insisted his defense counsel
(hereinafter “English”) not concede guilt as to any element of the charged
offense, believing he was innocent of any wrongdoing.66 Although English
reasonably believed the best way to avoid the death penalty was to concede
guilt to the murders and argue McCoy lacked the mental state requisite for
first-degree murder, McCoy disagreed and insisted English put on the
farfetched conspiracy defense and pursue acquittal.67 English—aware that
pursuing such a defense would be madness for his client—conceded guilt
over McCoy’s objection, believing this was truly the best strategy to maintain

62. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1506 (2018) (describing McCoy’s insistence he was
not in the State of Louisiana at the time of the murders).
63. See id. at 1506 (“[McCoy] insistently maintained he was out of State at the time of the killings
and that corrupt police killed the victims when a drug deal went wrong.”).
64. See id. at 1513 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing McCoy’s belief his attorney and federal
officials were involved in the plot).
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1506 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (“McCoy told English ‘not to make
that concession,’ and English knew of McCoy’s ‘complet[e] oppos[ition] to [English] telling the jury
that [McCoy] was guilty of killing the three victims’; instead of any concession, McCoy pressed English
to pursue acquittal.”).
67. See id. at 1506 & n.1 (describing English’s plan to concede guilt and argue for a lesser
offense); Jeffery C. Mays, To Try to Save Client’s Life, a Lawyer Ignored His Wishes. Can He Do That?, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/nyregion/mccoy-louisiana-lawyerlarry-english.html [https://perma.cc/PTG9-PKQ8] (“Mr. English said it was Mr. McCoy’s delusions
of a grand conspiracy that made his client unable to participate in his defense and that led him to
believe he had no choice but to try to save his client’s life.”).

154

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:144

credibility with the jury and spare his client’s life.68 Mr. English explained
his position in a post-trial affidavit stating:
I [knew] that [McCoy] was completely opposed to me telling the jury that he
was guilty of killing the three victims and telling the jury that he was crazy but
I believed that this was the only way to save his life. . . . I felt that as long as
I was his attorney of record it was my ethical duty to do what I thought was
best to save his life even though what he wanted me to do was to get him
acquitted in the guilt phase. . . . I firmly believe that Robert McCoy is insane
and was not competent to be tried . . . .69

McCoy’s actions demonstrated the extremely difficult hand dealt to English
in this case.70 English could either concede guilt—giving McCoy a fighting
chance at life in prison instead of a capital verdict—or do what the Supreme
Court now says is required and walk his client into the government’s “death
chamber.”71
The Supreme Court noted: “English harbored no doubt that McCoy
believed what he was saying, . . . English simply disbelieved McCoy’s
account in view of the prosecution’s evidence.”72 In light of this fact, the
Court incorrectly held English could not have violated the rules of ethics or
committed perjury because he did not actually know his client was lying.73
68. See State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d at 565–66 (portraying a post-trial affidavit from Mr. English
that states his concern with maintaining credibility with the jury; see also Steward v. Grace, No. 04-3587,
2007 WL 2571448, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2007) (“This is an established technique whereby a criminal
defendant, in order to enhance his credibility with the jury, concedes guilt in the liability phase in order
to more effectively persuade the jury to show leniency at sentencing.”). But see People v. Bergerud,
223 P.3d 686, 691 (Colo. 2010) (“Although defense counsel is free to develop defense theories based
on reasonable assessments of the evidence, as guided by her professional judgment, she cannot usurp
those fundamental choices given directly to criminal defendants by the United States and Colorado
Constitutions.”).
69. McCoy, 218 So. 3d at 565 (third omission in original).
70. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1512 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The real case is far more complex.
Indeed, the real situation English faced at the beginning of petitioner’s trial was the result of a freakish
confluence of factors that is unlikely to recur.”).
71. See id. at 1514 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (“As English observed, taking that
path would have only ‘help[ed] the District Attorney send [petitioner] to the death chamber.’”).
72. Id. at 1510; see also Mays, supra note 67 (“About a month before the trial, Mr. English told
Mr. McCoy that the case was unwinnable because of the evidence the prosecution had against him,
including that when Mr. McCoy was discovered, the gun used in the killings was under a seat of the
vehicle he was traveling in.”).
73. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1510 (“English simply disbelieved McCoy’s account in view of the
prosecution’s evidence. . . .
Louisiana’s ethical rules might have stopped English from
presenting McCoy’s alibi evidence if English knew perjury was involved. But Louisiana has identified

2020]

Comment

155

This distinction is farfetched and undermines the difficult position defense
counsel faces when dealing with this type of defendant.74 Additionally, the
Court’s opinion strangely acknowledged McCoy was ruled competent to
stand trial and be executed, barely glazing over the facts that (1) McCoy truly
believed he was out of the state at the time he killed three innocent people
and (2) was convinced the government (including the trial judge) was trying
to frame him in a massive conspiracy.75 On appeal, McCoy argued English
violated his constitutional right to counsel when English conceded guilt over
McCoy’s consistent objections.76 The Supreme Court agreed, going as far
as ruling such a concession a structural error—meaning there is no need to
show prejudice and the error automatically entitled McCoy to a new trial.77
IV. CLIENT PERJURY AND THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
The first argument of this Comment will focus on when an attorney can
withdraw from a case, particularly when the attorney believes her client will
commit perjury.78 Perjury occurs when “[a] witness testifying under oath
or affirmation . . . gives false testimony concerning a material matter with
the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of
confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.”79 The Supreme Court has not
clarified what amounts to knowledge of a client’s intent to commit perjury,
which would potentially justify counsel’s withdrawal. Unfortunately,
caselaw and the rules of professional conduct also do not clarify or define
no ethical rule requiring English to admit McCoy’s guilt over McCoy’s objection.”). But see MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so
that is not frivolous . . . .”); Id. at R. 3.3 (“A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . . make a false statement of
fact or law to a tribunal . . . [or] offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”); Id. at R. 8.5(a) (“A
lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction,
regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs.”).
74. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1513 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[P]etitioner and English were stuck with
each other, and petitioner availed himself of his right to take the stand to tell his wild story. Under
those circumstances, what was English supposed to do?”).
75. See id. (“[P]etitioner, who had been found competent to stand trial and had refused to plead
guilty by reason of insanity, insisted that he did not kill the victims. He claimed that the victims were
killed by the local police and that he had been framed by a farflung conspiracy of state and federal
officials . . . .”).
76. State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 550 (La. 2016).
77. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511–12.
78. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (stating when an attorney must and may
withdraw from representing a client—a lawyer must attempt to withdraw if the client insists on a course
of conduct that would violate the Rules, which includes committing perjury).
79. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993).
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what amounts to actual knowledge, although the rules do provide that
knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.80 To add to the
confusion, different courts use different standards for concluding what
amounts to the attorney knowing his client’s testimony will be perjurious.81
Courts have used multiple standards, including: (1) “good cause to believe
the defendant’s proposed testimony would be deliberately untruthful,”82
(2) “knowledge ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’”83 (3) “a firm factual basis,”84
(4) “a ‘good-faith determination,’”85 and (5) “actual knowledge.”86
Keeping all of these standards in mind, it seems obvious that—regardless
of what standard is used—when the evidence is overwhelming and the
client’s only defense is blaming the government for three homicides in a
drug deal gone south, an attorney can certainly use his professional
judgment in deciding whether or not this story is true, and whether or not
there is evidence to corroborate such an accusation.87 It would be
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (defining “knowingly” and stating “[a]
person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances”); see also State v. Chambers,
994 A.2d. 1248, 1259 (Conn. 2010) (“[O]ur Rules of Professional Conduct require ‘actual knowledge’
and not a mere ‘reasonable belief’ by the attorney that his client intends to commit perjury.”); Att’y U
v. The Miss. Bar, 678 So. 2d 963, 970 (Miss. 1996) (citation omitted) (“The Terminology section of the
Rules does not define ‘knowledge’ but it does define similar terms. ‘Knowingly,’ ‘Known[,’] or ‘Knows’
denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances. Nowhere, however, is ‘actual knowledge’ defined.”).
81. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237, 1246–47 (Mass. 2003) (discussing some
of the many different standards used by courts across the nation).
82. See State v. Hischke, 639 N.W.2d 6, 11 (Iowa 2002) (“Hischke satisfied the requisite
standard that a lawyer must be ‘convinced with good cause to believe the defendant’s proposed
testimony would be deliberately untruthful.’”).
83. See Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373, 1379 (Del. 1989) (“[A]n attorney should have
knowledge ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ before he can determine under Rule 3.3 that his client has
committed or is going to commit perjury. This standard of knowledge is necessary to allow the attorney
to represent the client zealously while remaining true to the judicial system.”).
84. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977) (“If an attorney
faced with this situation were in fact to discuss with the Trial Judge his belief that his client intended
to perjure himself, without possessing a firm factual basis for that belief, he would be violating the duty
imposed upon him as defense counsel.”).
85. See People v. Bartee, 566 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (applying a “good-faith
determination” standard as adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court (citing People v. Flores, 538 N.E.2d
481 (Ill. 1989))).
86. See United States v. Del Carpio-Cotrina, 733 F. Supp. 95, 99 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“However,
we do agree that a lawyer’s duty to disclose future crimes or fraud by the client depends on the lawyer’s
state of knowledge. In short, actual knowledge is required.”).
87. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237, 1247–48 (Mass. 2003) (giving
deference to trial counsel with thirty-five years of experience to use professional judgment in spotting
client perjury).
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unrealistic to reach any other conclusion but falsity given the evidence the
State had against McCoy and McCoy’s accusations. The lower courts erred
in not allowing English to withdraw, or alternatively not allowing McCoy to
proceed by himself if he wanted to put on a defense that his attorney firmly
believed was fraudulent.88
A. How the McCoy Holding Affects the Legal Profession
With the ruling in McCoy, defense attorneys—especially those who handle
capital crimes—will be discouraged from taking these already immensely
complex life or death cases.89 Taking capital cases is a demanding and
emotional task for any lawyer, but when the lines get blurred with opinions
like McCoy, attorneys will not want to put their reputations—including their
professional disciplinary reputations—at risk to take these cases.90 All
attorneys who are able and willing should take capital cases and fight to save
the client’s life.91 But attorneys will not do this when the rules for capital
punishment proceedings are so unclear, and caselaw from the Supreme
Court only adds to the perplexity.92 Moreover, higher courts pick apart
professional trial strategy at every turn, causing capital defense attorneys—
who are already few in number—to stop taking these cases altogether.93

88. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1513 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“English told
petitioner ‘some eight months’ before trial that the only viable strategy was to admit the killings and to
concentrate on attempting to avoid a sentence of death. . . . [P]etitioner could have discharged English
and sought new counsel willing to pursue his conspiracy defense . . . .”).
89. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Should There Be a Specialized Ethics Code for Death-Penalty Defense
Lawyers?, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 527, 533 (2016) (“The unusual nature and vulnerability of the
clientele—individuals, many with mental impairments, whose lives are on the line—leads to particular
challenges of decision-making and counseling.”).
90. See, e.g., id. at 533–34 (footnote omitted) (“Death penalty defense is complex and
demanding, and the quality of the defense matters to the outcome.”).
91. See, e.g., CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE DEF. FUNCTION Standard 4-1.2(e) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunction
FourthEdition/ [https://perma.cc/R2XH-CW4Z] (stating, generally, defense counsel should actively
contribute to the administration of justice and to improving the law and criminal justice system as a
whole).
92. See Mays, supra note 67 (“We are looking for guidance. This area of the law is ripe with
ambiguity and mistakes . . . .”).
93. See Representation, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policyissues/death-penalty-representation [https://perma.cc/5LQA-DYGE] (indicating “most states have
raised the standards for representation,” but many counties lack resources for providing adequate
representation in a capital case).
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In fact, attorney Larry English never practiced law again after taking the
McCoy case because he “went into a deep depression,” and knew that “[he]
could never put [himself] through that again, emotionally.”94
Larry English had dedicated his life and criminal law practice to help fight
injustice in the United States.95 Mr. English, who grew up poor in rural
Louisiana with six siblings, beat the odds and graduated from Tulane Law
School.96 When given the chance to represent McCoy, English saw the
opportunity “as part of a larger struggle against injustice” in the United
States.97 English was dedicated to making a real change in our system,
which “is so racked by racism and classism that there is no way the death
penalty can be implemented in a way that’s constitutional.”98 During the
McCoy case, English frequently spoke to his friend Bridgett Brown, a lawyer
friend of nearly two decades.99 Ms. Brown had tried three capital cases in
the past and described the situation as English having the “job nobody
wanted.”100 Unfortunately, English has now retired from practicing law,
and another warrior in our justice system is lost due to a broken system that
will not face difficult issues head on.101
It is certainly not desirable to run attorneys out of the business—
especially those dedicated to changing the system. When a citizen’s life is at
stake and terrible crimes have been committed, the most competent
attorneys are necessary to ensure the end result is just, and due process is
afforded at every step. With the help of the Supreme Court and the ABA,
this can be done by making the rules clear and through guiding attorneys
instead of second-guessing their professional decisions.

94. See Mays, supra note 67 (detailing English’s reaction to the McCoy case).
95. See id. (“All these lives are coming in, and you are doing everything you can to save them.
It was my way of fighting the system.”).
96. See id. (“Mr. English, who is 62, grew up poor with six siblings on a sharecropper’s farm in
rural Louisiana. [English] said he had ‘a better chance of being the starting point guard for the New
York Knickerbockers than graduating from Tulane Law School.’”).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. (explaining lawyers are in need of guidance and clarification in this area of the law).
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B. Potential Solutions to the McCoy Problem
The first proposed solution to the McCoy dilemma is a specialized code
for death penalty litigation.102 This code would set specific rules for
litigators encountering tough issues that frequently arise in death penalty
cases.103 This specialized code could include a separate code of
professional responsibility and ethics that would guide attorneys who are
forced to work with a client who is committing perjury or insisting on a
bizarre defense objective. This seems like a dramatic course of action—
especially because it could potentially flood the courts with other specialized
attorneys arguing for a specialized code within their area of law—but it
seems reasonable and necessary for death penalty litigation.104 The death
penalty case is a truly particular area of the law, as it uniquely involves life
or death.105 Thus, the need for a specialized set of rules is crucial. As one
commentator explained:
[T]here are areas of professional conduct where lawyers—particularly those
working in specialized legal practices—do not have adequate guidance about
how to resolve ethics problems. These lawyers face disciplinary and other
legal risks because of the vagueness, uncertainty, or incompleteness of the
ethics rules. . . . Ideally, the problem would be addressed by additional, clearer
rules that are tailored to the relevant areas . . . .106

Of course, a better solution would be for the Court to address the
perjurious client issue, which arises with defendants like Robert McCoy.
This would not be an easy task, but it is one important enough to be
necessary.
The Supreme Court could have initiated this resolution by clearly defining
what amounts to knowledge of perjury. It is unclear what constitutes
102. See Green, supra note 89, at 532–34 (explaining why capital defense differs significantly
from other types of criminal cases and involve frequent ethical issues that need to be addressed swiftly
and accurately).
103. See id. (“If there are areas of practice where generalized ethics rules provide insufficient
guidance, one might assume that death penalty defense is one of them.”)
104. See id. at 534 (explaining death penalty defense cases often involve particularly distinct and
important ethical problems that require wise solutions). But see id. at 534–35 (addressing some of the
potential pitfalls, including objections from other attorneys and judges who deal with specialized issues,
in adopting a specialized code).
105. See id. at 534 (“[D]eath penalty defense would seem to be an area of practice where it is
especially important for lawyers to resolve ethics problems appropriately, and where lawyers would
need more guidance than usual in determining how to reach adequate resolutions.”).
106. Id. at 556.
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knowledge of a client’s intent to commit perjury, and cases are conflicting
on the issue.107 The Supreme Court has held defense counsel must know
their client is going to commit perjury before they may withdraw; but how
does one ever truly know—without a shadow of doubt—what his client is
saying is not true? Is absolutely no evidence to corroborate the client’s
version of the facts enough?108 Is it enough if the client merely changes
her story before trial?109 Is it enough if the attorney is almost certain the
client is fabricating her story because she has nothing to live for?
One such case on the issue includes Nix v. Whiteside,110 in which the
Supreme Court held: “An attorney’s duty of confidentiality . . . does not
extend to a client’s announced plans to engage in . . . criminal conduct.”111
The Court in Nix held “an ethical lawyer, as an officer of the court,” should
be “dedicated to a search for truth,” and the right to counsel does not
include the right to have a lawyer who will cooperate with planned
perjury.112 In fact, the Court stated if a lawyer does cooperate in such
conduct, he would risk suspension and disbarment from the practice of
law.113 However, the Court does not provide guidance on what constitutes
knowledge of a client’s intent to commit perjury.114 The client in Nix
actually manifested his intent to commit perjury by telling his attorney
directly that he intended to testify falsely and claim he saw a gun because he

107. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 160–61 (1986) (indicating when a defendant changes
his story right before trial, defense counsel has enough evidence to know her client is going to perjure
himself). But see United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 322–23 (4th Cir. 2003) (declaring the
defendant’s “mystery man did it” story, although lacking any corroboration, was not enough to know
the defendant was lying).
108. See generally McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (demonstrating an instance in
which the defendant’s version of the facts was wholly uncorroborated); Midgett, 342 F.3d 321 (providing
another instance in which the defendant’s version of the facts is uncorroborated and uncredible).
109. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 160–61 (demonstrating an instance in which the defendant’s story was
consistent up until the eve of trial).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 174 (citing Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933)).
112. See id. at 174 (“[T]he responsibility of an ethical lawyer, as an officer of the court and a key
component of a system of justice, dedicated to a search for truth, is essentially the same whether the
client announces an intention to bribe or threaten witnesses or jurors or to commit or procure
perjury.”).
113. See id. at 173 (“A lawyer who would so cooperate would be at risk of prosecution for
suborning perjury, and disciplinary proceedings, including suspension or disbarment.”).
114. See generally id. (failing to specify when an attorney knows a client intends to perjure
himself).
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believed if he did not he was “dead.”115 However, these types of express
concessions are rare.
For example, in United States v. Midgett,116 the defendant was charged with
damaging a vehicle with fire and injuring another, bank robbery, and
threatening a bank teller with gasoline.117 Midgett and his lawyer were at
odds from the outset of the case.118 Among other things, Midgett was not
satisfied with his lawyer’s unwillingness to pursue a “‘third person’
defense.”119 According to Midgett, there was a third person involved who
committed the assaults while Midgett himself was “in a drug-induced sleep
in the back of the vehicle.”120 Unfortunately for Midgett, there was
absolutely no corroborating evidence to support his “third person”
theory.121 As Midgett’s attorney stated on the record: “[T]he issue relates
to whether or not a third person was at the scene at the time of the
destruction incident when [the victim] was burned, a third person actually
did the act. . . . There’s nothing whatsoever that I can find to corroborate
any such representation.”122
The court in Midgett distinguished these facts from Nix and held
the attorney did not actually know that his client was going to commit
perjury.123 The court stated Midgett had been consistent with his
story and his lawyer’s responsibility to him did not depend on the
quantity of proof in favor of or contrary to Midgett’s version of the

115.
Whiteside consistently stated to [counsel] that he had not actually seen a gun, but that he was
convinced that [the victim] had a gun in his hand. About a week before trial . . . Whiteside for
the first time told [counsel] and his associate Donna Paulsen that he had seen something
“metallic” in [the victims] hand. When asked about this, Whiteside responded: “[I]n
Howard Cook’s case there was a gun. If I don’t say I saw a gun, I’m dead.”
See id. at 160–61 (fifth alteration in original).
116. United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003).
117. Id. at 322.
118. Id.
119. See id. (“According to Midgett, it was [his co-accused’s] friend, and not Midgett, who had
committed the assault . . . while Midgett lay in a drug-induced sleep in the back of the vehicle. . . .
[Midgett’s] lawyer did not want Midgett to take the stand because he did not believe Midgett’s version
of events.”).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 323.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 325–26 (distinguishing the facts of the case from those in Nix).
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facts.124 The court recognized this “mystery man did it” story lacked
corroboration but found persuasive the fact Midgett never changed his story
and never admitted he intended to commit perjury.125 The court stated—
quite comically—that “[d]efense counsel’s mere belief, albeit a strong one
supported by other evidence, was not a sufficient basis to refuse Midgett’s
need for assistance in presenting his own testimony.”126
Courts ought to give defense counsel a lot of deference in these situations
because, other than the client themselves, counsel is in the best position to
know whether her client is lying or telling the truth. Defense counsel works
directly with the client and has access to all the facts, including those that
are confidential. Thus, when defense counsel wants to withdraw from a
case because she is quite certain her client is committing perjury, she ought
to not be challenged by the court or have her “belief, albeit a strong one”
questioned by judges who have not been working directly with the client
and likely have no experience working with criminal clients.127 When
courts publish opinions like the one in Midgett, they create a situation where
defense counsel, who are already in a difficult situation, must potentially put
their reputations and license at risk for a client who insists on a potentially
frivolous defense with no corroborating evidence.128 Furthermore,
defenses like this are comical for a jury because jurors are not incompetent
and know when a defendant is reaching in an effort to escape prison.

124. See id. at 326 (“Defense counsel’s responsibility to his client was not dependent on whether
he personally believed Midgett, nor did it depend on the amount of proof supporting or contradicting
Midgett’s anticipated testimony regarding how the incident happened.”).
125. See id. at 325–26 (“Midgett consistently maintained that his third-person defense was true
and that he believed his co-defendant could corroborate his story.”).
126. Id. at 326.
127. See id. at 326 (stating although counsel’s belief of perjury was very strong, it was not enough
to know his client intended to commit perjury). But see People v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (explaining a potential downside to allowing counsel to withdraw is that the client
could now find another attorney who lacks ethical standards who may help the client defraud the
court).
128. See Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century: Representations of the Unabomber,
24 VT. L. REV. 417, 528 (2000) (“For the capital defense lawyer, issues of ethics are neither theoretical
nor abstract. How he or she addresses these issues will drive virtually every aspect of how the client’s
case will be investigated and litigated.”); see also Michael S. McGinniss, The Character of Codes: Preserving
Spaces for Personal Integrity in Lawyer Regulation, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 559, 566 (2016) (“The most
fundamental reason to exercise restraint when imposing specific mandates in lawyer regulation is to
create space for individual lawyers to integrate their personal, moral, and religious convictions with
their professional lives.”).
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C. How McCoy Affects Trial Strategy and Using the Narrative Approach to
Avoid Attorney Discipline
The Supreme Court’s ruling in McCoy also makes problems worse in terms
of credibility with the court and jury.129 If English did put on the
implausible conspiracy defense, he would have lost all credibility and the
trial would have been a circus full of meritless accusations.130 Furthermore,
by putting on a fruitless defense, English would be subject to discipline for
perjuring the court and bringing claims with no corroborating evidence.131
A potential way around discipline would be through a specialized death
penalty code, addressed above, which would provide attorneys with
breathing room when dealing with these types of clients.132 Another
solution proposed for situations when an attorney has a perjurious client is
to use the narrative approach; however, that approach has been criticized
and raises further issues that the Court should have addressed in McCoy.133
1.

The Narrative Approach and Pitfalls Associated with this Approach

Although it is well established attorneys may not assist their clients in
committing perjury, nothing stops them from allowing their clients to get
on the stand and tell their story without guidance.134 This is the “narrative
approach,” which allows the defendant to tell her side of the story without

129. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1515 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Endorsing
petitioner’s bizarre defense would have been extraordinarily unwise . . . .”); see also State v. McCoy,
218 So. 3d 535, 565 (La. 2016) (“I needed to maintain my credibility with the jury in the penalty phase
and could not do that if I argued in the guilt phase that he was not in Louisiana at the time of the
killings, as he insisted.”)
130. As we have seen before in the famous Unabomber case, allowing unrealistic accusations
to freely come into court can create a chaotic environment:
[Judge Burrell] understandably developed a strong desire to avoid the chaos, legal and otherwise,
that would have ensued had Kaczynski been allowed to present his twisted theories to a jury as
his defense to a capital murder charge. Not only would such a trial have had a circus atmosphere
but, in light of Kaczynski’s aversion to mitigating evidence, it would in all likelihood have resulted
in his execution.
United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1126 (9th Cir. 2001).
131. See sources cited supra note 73.
132. See supra Section IV.B. and accompanying footnotes.
133. See infra Section IV.C.1 and accompanying footnotes.
134. See People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“Under the narrative
approach, the attorney calls the defendant to the witness stand but does not engage in the usual
question and answer exchange. Instead, the attorney permits the defendant to testify in a free narrative
manner.”).
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it being in question and answer form like a typical direct examination.135
However, this approach is problematic because it is well known that it is
only used when an attorney believes his client is committing perjury.136
Thus, the attorney is essentially selling out his client and also tainting his
own defense.137 Likewise, if even one juror knows this method is only used
when the attorney believes his client is committing perjury,138 the whole
jury pool could potentially be tainted, and the case will almost certainly be
lost. Moreover, the attorney is portraying his client as a liar and as someone
who disregards the oath and the law to the judge and prosecutor who know
very well why the approach is being used.139
This unfavorable solution is even more problematic because the
defendant is subject to cross-examination and is effectively ruining her
credibility on the stand without her attorney’s guidance. Furthermore, when
telling a story without the guidance of an experienced trial attorney, the
version of events may be told out of order or in a manner that does not
quite make sense. This could be especially true for a client in a court room
setting with the judge and jury watching and nerves racing.
2.

Attempting to Withdraw as Counsel and Prejudicial Effects

Aside from using the flawed narrative approach, a client is further
prejudiced because the rules of professional conduct require an attorney
135. See id. (describing the “narrative approach”).
136. See People v. Andrades, 828 N.E.2d 599, 604 (N.Y. 2005) (“[I]f counsel were permitted to
present defendant’s testimony in narrative form without objection, the very fact of defendant testifying
in such a manner would signify to the court that counsel believes that his client is perjuring himself.”);
see also State v. McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500, 504 (Wis. 2004) (“[D]efense counsel may not substitute
narrative questioning for the traditional question and answer format unless counsel knows that the
client intends to testify falsely. Absent the most extraordinary circumstances, such knowledge must be
based on the client’s expressed admission of intent to testify untruthfully.”); United States v. Rantz,
826 F.2d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 1988) (justifying defense counsel’s failure to put his client on the stand
because of the state’s overwhelming evidence, which led counsel to believe that his client’s testimony
would be false); People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751, 753–54 (N.Y. 2001) (“A lawyer with a perjurious
client must contend with competing considerations—duties of zealous advocacy, confidentiality and
loyalty to the client on the one hand, and a responsibility to the courts and our truth-seeking system of
justice on the other.”).
137. See Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814 (“The narrative approach has also been criticized as
communicating to the jury that the defendant is committing perjury.”).
138. Id.
139. See id. (“This procedure could hardly have failed to convey to the jury the impression that
the defendant’s counsel attached little significance or credibility to the testimony of the witness, or that
the defendant and his counsel were at odds. Prejudice to the defendant’s case by this trial tactic was
inevitable.” (quoting State v. Robinson, 224 S.E.2d 174, 180 (N.C. 1976))).
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attempt to withdraw when his client commits perjury on the stand.140 The
dramatic effect this has on a client’s case is emphasized in Lowery v.
Cardwell.141
In Lowery, the Ninth Circuit correctly highlighted the effect a motion to
withdraw has on a client when it is done in the midst of trial, especially when
it is during a bench trial as it was in this case.142 In Lowery, defense counsel
moved to withdraw from the case when his client testified as to something
the attorney believed was false.143 Although the attorney was within the
bounds of the rules in doing so,144 the court stressed the troubling effects
this has on a client’s case. Among other things, the motion to withdraw
clearly communicates to the judge—and potentially the jury if the motion is
granted—that something has gone terribly wrong between the client and
attorney.145 This sends a troubling message to the court and greatly reduces
the chance of a favorable verdict for the defendant. In effect, a motion to
withdraw in these circumstances deprives the defendant of a fair trial
because the court now knows the defendant is not credible.146 The Lowery
court ultimately held that the attorney’s conduct was proper.147 The court,
however, plainly stated “this is an unhappy result” because it is inescapable
though extremely unfavorable.148
140. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (stating a lawyer
must attempt to withdraw if the client insists on an unlawful course of conduct, which clearly includes
committing perjury).
141. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[I]f . . . counsel informs the
fact finder of his belief he has, by that action, disabled the fact finder from judging the merits of the
defendant’s defense. . . . [and] openly placed himself in opposition to his client upon her defense. The
consequences . . . deprive the defendant of a fair trial.”).
142. See id. (stating a motion to withdraw mid-trial based on a belief of perjury may negate the
possibility of a fair trial).
143. Id. at 729.
144. See id. at 730 (footnote omitted) (“The result on these unusual facts is not inconsistent with
the principles of professional responsibility under ethical standards as they are generally recognized
today and does not expose counsel to a charge of subornation of perjury.”).
145. See supra note 141.
146. See Lowery, 575 F.2d at 730 (explaining after counsel moved to withdraw and stated he
could not divulge his reasoning for the motion, “the only conclusion that could rationally be drawn by
the judge was that in the belief of her counsel appellant had falsely denied shooting the deceased”).
147. Id. at 730–31.
148. The court in Lowery reluctantly states:
Trial counsel is to be commended for his attention to professional responsibility. . . . We are
acutely aware of the anomaly presented when mistrial must result from counsel’s bona fide efforts
to avoid professional irresponsibility. We find no escape, however, from the conclusion that
fundamental requisites of fair trial have been irretrievably lost.

166

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 11:144

D. Raising the Competency Standard as an Alternative Solution
Another alternative solution to this problem would be to refine and raise
the competency standard for capital punishment defendants in every state
which implements the death penalty. Given the fact life or death is at stake,
as well as the importance of capital defendants receiving a fair trial, it would
not be unreasonable to raise the competency bar for capital punishment
defendants. Many capital punishment defendants are mentally unstable and
have gone through trauma which has put them on a destructive path.149
Given that many of these individuals are mentally unstable, on top of the
implications of a jury verdict in a capital case—not only on the defendant
but also on the jury’s own conscience—it is not unreasonable to
categorically and uniformly raise the standard for these limited cases, which
are of the utmost importance in our justice system.
The Supreme Court should categorically adopt, for death penalty
jurisdictions, the competency standard recommended by the ABA.150 This
Id. at 731 (footnote omitted).
149. See Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental
Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 791 (2009) (“Indeed, many prisoners on death row, and
many who have been executed, have suffered from demonstrable mental illness.”); see also Donald P.
Judges, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Moral Disengagement,
41 HOUS. L. REV. 515, 532 (2004) (“Psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental health professionals
participate in the capital punishment process in several capacities . . . . [M]ental health professionals’
role in the capital punishment process continues to expand, and this expansion has pushed the edges
of the ethical envelope.”).
150. Paul M. Igasaki, A.B.A. Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities,
Recommendation No. 122A, at 1–2 (2006). The ABA’s recommended competency standard is:
1.

Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time of the offense, they
had significant limitations in both their intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills, resulting from mental
retardation, dementia, or a traumatic brain injury.

2.

Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the time of the offense, they
had a severe mental disorder or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to
appreciate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise
rational judgment in relation to the conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the
requirements of the law. A disorder manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct or
attributable solely to the acute effects of voluntary use of alcohol or other drugs does not,
standing alone, constitute a mental disorder or disability for purposes of this provision.

3.

Mental Disorder or Disability after Sentencing
(a) Grounds for Precluding Execution. A sentence of death should not be carried out if the
prisoner has a mental disorder or disability that significantly impairs his or her capacity (i) to
make a rational decision to forgo or terminate post-conviction proceedings available to
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rule is not a novel solution to the dilemma faced by defense attorneys
dealing with a McCoy defendant. Justice Powell, in his Ford v. Wainwright151
concurring opinion, suggested raising the competency standard for capital
defendants;152 his argument is now even more relevant and carries more
force than it did when the case was decided in 1986. Justice Powell
addressed the issue of competency for execution, stating the Eighth
Amendment “forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.”153
Justice Powell suggested the proper test of competency should be whether
defendants can comprehend the nature, pendency, and purpose of their
execution.154 Further, he encouraged the states to adopt “a more expansive
view of sanity,” which included the “requirement that the defendant be able
to assist in his own defense[,]” stressing the Eighth Amendment
competency requirement is only a minimum standard.155
Despite Justice Powell’s encouragement, states have failed to provide
specific guidelines for evaluating a defendant’s competency for execution.
This is problematic because a capital punishment trial is extremely intense
for the defendant and the jury who must decide whether to sentence another
citizen to death. Making the decision of whether to send a mentally unstable
citizen to the death chamber is a decision which must not be taken
lightly.156 Raising the competency standard in capital punishment trials
would give deference to the rising issues of mental health in the United
States.

challenge the validity of the conviction or sentence; (ii) to understand or communicate
pertinent information, or otherwise assist counsel, in relation to specific claims bearing on
the validity of the conviction or sentence that cannot be fairly resolved without the
prisoner’s participation; or (iii) to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment, or
to appreciate the reason for its imposition in the prisoner’s own case.
Id. at 1.
151. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
152. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
153. Id.
154. See id. (“[O]nly if the defendant is aware that his death is approaching can he prepare
himself for his passing.”).
155. Id. at 422 n.3.
156. Cf. Winick, supra note 149, at 789 (“[T]he American Bar Association (“ABA”), the
American Psychiatric Association (“APsyA”), the American Psychological Association (“APA”), the
National Alliance on Mental Illness (“NAMI”), and Mental Health America (“MHA”) (formerly known
as the National Mental Health Association)-—have adopted policy statements that recommend
prohibiting the execution of those with severe mental illness.”).
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Mental health has become a topic of conversation in recent years, but the
courts have not given enough deference to the mental health of capital
defendants. While it is true not all capital defendants are incapable of
understanding the consequences of their actions, it is also true mental
illnesses account for many heinous crimes.157 Additionally, raising the
competency standard would not allow defendants to get away with terrible
crimes. Instead, this would merely require that when a defendant is mentally
ill, he must be given a life sentence instead of the death penalty.158 This is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s rulings disallowing execution of a
mentally retarded defendant.159
The Supreme Court in McCoy completely failed to address some of these
tough issues and instead punished the defense counsel by ruling his
concession of guilt was structural error.160 The McCoy opinion is illfounded and makes defense counsel’s already tough moral and ethical
decisions in capital cases even more difficult.161 When clients, especially in
the context of capital punishment cases, insist on putting on a frivolous
defense with no corroborating evidence, defense counsel ought to have the
authority to make a judgment call on whether they want to continue with
the representation of their client.162
157. See, e.g., Serious Mental Illnesses and Homicide, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR. (June 2016),
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/evidence-and-research/learn-more-about/3627 [https://
perma.cc/F7LW-UV4H] (“[I]ndividuals with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are responsible for
approximately 10% of all homicides in the United States. For mass killings, the percentage is
approximately 33% . . . .”).
158. See, e.g., Jolie McCullough, Texas House OKs Bill to Ban Death Penalty for Those with Severe Mental
Illness, TEX. TRIB. (May 8, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/08/texas-death-penaltyrules-could-change-some-mentally-ill-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/4TPD-FAFA] (“For the second
time in two weeks, the Texas House moved to change death penalty law. On Wednesday, the chamber
tentatively passed a measure that would prohibit handing down a death sentence to someone with a
severe mental illness, like schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.”).
159. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 149, at 785–86 (footnotes omitted) (“The Court, in effect,
announced that the Constitution requires a per se finding of diminished responsibility. All people with
mental retardation, the Court held, are constitutionally exempt from capital punishment based upon
their diagnosis alone.”).
160. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1511 (2018).
161. See Green, supra note 89, at 533 (“The unusual nature and vulnerability of the clientele—
individuals, many with mental impairments, whose lives are on the line—leads to particular challenges
of decision-making and counseling.”).
162. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (affirming an appellate lawyer was not
required to accede to the defendant’s request to raise particular non-frivolous arguments); see also
United States v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88, 92–93 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating a lawyer did not provide ineffective
assistance in arguing ridiculous theories upon the defendant’s insistence); Nelson v. State, 21 P.3d 55,
60–61 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (suggesting—although the defendant’s most plausible defense was
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The Supreme Court in McCoy notes: in some instances a defendant may
not want to avoid being put to death and instead may “above all else, [want
to avoid] the opprobrium [attending admission that] he killed family
members[, o]r he may hold life in prison not worth living and prefer to risk
death for any hope, however small, of exoneration.”163 However, this is
no excuse for letting a man purposefully walk himself into the government’s
death chamber and, in effect, commit suicide because he does not want to
live with the consequences of his actions. The Supreme Court is essentially
implying counsel should put aside the fact his client is committing suicide
because the client may prefer death to prison.164 This reasoning is flawed
and only worsens a major problem in our justice system. The United States
has more people incarcerated than any other country in the world.165 As
of July 2020, there was an estimated 2,591 inmates on death row.166 With
the holding in McCoy, the Court only adds fuel to this fire.
Defense counsel should not be forced to put on a certain outlandish
defense when there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. More
importantly, defense counsel should not be forced to ruin their reputation
with the court, the jury, and the prosecution. It is likely attorneys will have
to work together in the future and defense counsel should not be forced to
raise meritless accusations against peers in the legal community. Although
counsel certainly will have to raise some issues because their client insists,
this does not amount to raising claims against the trial judge, federal, and
state governments.
The client’s interests nonetheless do come first, and defense counsel shall

insanity—trial counsel was not ineffective in acceding to the defendant’s decision not to raise the
defense); State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86, 89–90 (Conn. 1986) (indicating a trial lawyer is not
constitutionally required to call a witness whom the defendant instructed him to call).
163. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508.
164. See id. at 1508–09 (stating an attorney is obligated to uphold the client’s express objective
of maintaining innocence even in light of overwhelming evidence to the contrary).
165. Campbell Robertson, Crime Is Down, Yet U.S. Incarceration Rates Are Still Among the Highest in
the World, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/us-massincarceration-rate.html [https://perma.cc/B4BK-5W66]; Highest to Lowest—Prison Population Total,
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, https://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-populationtotal?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All [https://perma.cc/4NPF-8EZQ] (showing a total of 2.1 million
prisoners incarcerated in the United States; China is the second on the list with 1.7 million incarcerated).
166. DEBORAH FINS, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A.
SUMMER 2020, at 1 (2020), https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/DRUSASummer
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/63RU-AVRB].
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not use these recommendations as an excuse to be lazy or not fully litigate
tough cases. However, litigating zealously for a client does not mean an
attorney has to ruin her reputation while doing so. In situations where there
is overwhelming evidence against a client, the best way to craft a defense
may be to concede guilt but focus on mitigation evidence or an insanity
defense. This is exactly what English did in McCoy,167 and it was consistent
with many other cases in Louisiana which allowed the concession even if
the client objected.168 Additionally, this defense may have worked if it was
not for McCoy’s testimony to the jury in an unsuccessful attempt to put on
his conspiracy defense.
V. THE LACK OF GUIDANCE FROM THE ABA MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES
IN THE UNITED STATES
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not reflect what the
Supreme Court now says is required of defense counsel after McCoy.169 The
Rules do not reflect that a client is in charge of the tactical strategy of
whether or not to concede guilt during trial as to one element of the charged
offense.170 Conceding guilt as to an element of the charge is largely a
tactical decision done when defense counsel believes it will mitigate
punishment at sentencing.171 This strategy is commonly used when the
State’s evidence is truly overwhelming.172 In these situations, the best thing
to do as defense counsel is to focus on mitigation investigation and do
anything possible to minimize liability at sentencing.173

167. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
168. See discussion infra Section VI.A–B.
169. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see McCoy,
138 S. Ct. at 1512 (giving criminal defendants the right to insist their attorney not concede guilt as to
any element of a crime).
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s
decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by
the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive
jury trial and whether the client will testify.”).
171. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191–92 (2004) (stating it is hopeless in many cases to
put on a charade before the jury as many triers of fact would prefer candor).
172. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
173. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 192 (“In a capital case, counsel must consider in conjunction both the
guilt and penalty phases in determining how best to proceed.”).
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A. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Are Silent on the Issue
of Conceding Guilt
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct reflect that in a criminal
case the client decides: (1) whether or not to proceed with a jury trial,
(2) whether to plead guilty, and (3) whether or not to take the stand and
testify.174 This is the objective/means rule, which essentially states the
client is in charge of the objective and the attorney the means.175
Furthermore, the rules make clear that trial strategy is decided by the
attorney and not the client.176 This is reasonable because it is the attorney
and not the client who is an experienced advocate. The rules further reflect
an attorney may not help his client commit a crime, which clearly includes
committing perjury.177 Also, an attorney has a duty of candor toward the
court and has a duty to not pursue and litigate meritless claims.178 In fact,
an attorney can be disbarred for helping a client commit perjury and not
being candid with the tribunal.179
B. Mental Health Issues Are Rampant in the Criminal Justice System
The Death Penalty Information Center provides that mental health issues
have a tremendous impact in death penalty cases.180 Actually, “[o]ne in ten
174. See source cited supra note 170.
175. See W. Bradley Wendel, Autonomy Isn’t Everything: Some Cautionary Notes on McCoy v.
Louisiana, 9 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 92, 108 (2018) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (“The client may be ‘the master of his or her own defense[,]’ but the lawyer is
‘captain of the ship.’”).
176. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“Clients
normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used
to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters.”).
177. Id. at R. 1.16(a)(1), 3.3; see also People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751, 753–54 (N.Y. 2001) (“A
lawyer with a perjurious client must contend with competing considerations—duties of zealous
advocacy, confidentiality and loyalty to the client on the one hand, and a responsibility to the courts
and our truth-seeking system of justice on the other.”).
178. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 & 3.3. But see supra note 162 and
accompanying text.
179. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. . . .
If . . . the lawyer’s client . . . has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity,
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”).
180. Mental Illness, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policyissues/mental-illness [https://perma.cc/XS8C-4F6Z] (discussing the broad impact mental illnesses
have on a defendant’s criminal case); see also Mental Health and the Death Penalty, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN CONTEXT, https://capitalpunishmentincontext.org/issues/mentalhealth [https://perma.cc/
94N2-ZB8A] (“The defendant’s state of mind is often an issue in death penalty cases because the
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prisoners executed in the United States are ‘volunteers’—defendants or
prisoners who have waived key trial or appeal rights to” increase their
chances of execution.181 The Death Penalty Information Center also
provides that mental illnesses affect defendants’ decisions whether or not to
represent themselves, their ability to cooperate with attorneys, and even
influences the jury’s perception of the individual because they must decide
“whether they pose a future danger to society if” the jury gives a sentence
of life instead of death.182 Nonetheless, the bar for competency is low, and
if a defendant is able to communicate with his attorney, he will likely be
ruled competent to stand trial and be afforded the right to be the master of
his defense.183 This is extremely problematic because at some point the
courts must allow defense counsel to do what is best for her client—who
may be competent to stand trial but clearly incompetent to realize what is in
his best interest legally and strategically in the context of a capital
punishment trial.184
C. The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Capital Cases
Mental health professionals, especially psychiatrists and psychologists,
play an increasingly important role in capital punishment cases.185 From
pretrial competency evaluations to helping restore competence to prepare
for execution, mental health professionals are heavily involved in the
process of executing our death row inmates.186 This, of course, is a
problem because mental health professionals are in the business of
defendant’s mental health affects his or her culpability for the crime, ability to assist counsel, and ability
to understand the connection between the crime and the punishment imposed.”).
181. Mental Illness, supra note 180; see also John Blume, Give Me Death, A Lawyer Explains Why His
Client Volunteered to Be Executed, UTNE READER (Nov.–Dec. 2005), www.utne.com/mind-andbody/give-me-death-prisoner-volunteers-for-execution [https://perma. cc/JPN8-ZKXE] (describing
a client who had nothing to live for and essentially volunteered to be executed by waiving key rights).
182. Mental Illness, supra note 180.
183. See Sullivan, supra note 17, at 749 (recognizing how a client may be a competent decision
maker on other issues but may utterly fail to appreciate the severity of the charges and the consequences
of a proposed objective).
184. See State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 565 (La. 2016) (discussing the defense attorney’s belief
he could only save McCoy’s life by conceding guilt); see also supra note 183.
185. See Judges, supra note 149, at 552 (describing the growing role played by mental health
professionals in the process surrounding capital punishment).
186. See id. at 532–33 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (“Mental health professionals . . .
perform assessment functions in both civil and criminal cases. In the general criminal arena, the
services they provide include assessment, consultation, and testimony related to competency to
waive . . . rights and to stand trial, criminal responsibility (such as the insanity defense and mens rea),
sentencing, parole, and other dispositional matters.”).
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providing treatment, not killing.187 In fact, in some cases doctors have
refused to give treatment to these types of defendants and received serious
backlash and threats from the government for doing so, including being
threatened with contempt of court.188 This is quite shocking considering
doctors are being threatened with contempt for exercising their own rules
of professional conduct.189 However, it seems clear these professionals are
crucial to the administration of justice and perform vital roles in our criminal
justice system.
The bigger issue is the amount of death row inmates with major mental
health problems.190 Although these inmates are severely ill, the bar for
competency is low and if that bar is met, they are eligible for death for
committing a capital offense.191 While it is true someone must pay when
these wicked crimes are committed, it is not in the best interest of anyone
involved to put to death a person who is unable to understand the
consequences of her actions.192
The Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright193 prohibited the use of capital
punishment on an insane defendant in 1986.194 The Court again reiterated

187. See Brian D. Shannon & Victor R. Scarano, Incompetency to Be Executed: Continuing Ethical
Challenges & Time for a Change in Texas, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 425 (2013) (discussing the
Hippocratic Oath physicians traditionally take to “do no harm or injustice” to their patients); cf. Judges,
supra note 149, at 548–49 (providing insight on the ethical dilemmas mental health professionals face
during various mandatory evaluations of death row inmates).
188. See Judges, supra note 149, at 549–50 (describing an Arizona doctor who refused to give a
severely ill defendant psychotics to restore him to competence and was threatened with contempt of
court from the Arizona Attorney General’s Office).
189. Id. at 550 (“In other words, the state’s highest legal office actually considered employing
the legal process to force a physician to violate his own professional ethical code—a code that the state
would otherwise enforce—and to become an involuntary formal participant in executing a human
being.”).
190. See Position Statement 54: Death Penalty and People with Mental Illnesses, MENTAL HEALTH AM.,
https://www.mhanational.org/issues/position-statement-54-death-penalty-and-people-mental-illness
es [https://perma.cc/W85Y-GJWZ] (“Although precise statistics are not available, it is estimated that
at least [twenty] percent of people on death row have a serious mental illness.”); see also FINS, supra
note 166 (noting the number of prisoners on death row per state).
191. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966) (holding criminal defendants must first be
ruled competent to stand trial if there are doubts as to whether or not they understand the charges
brought against them); see also People v. Shrake, 182 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Ill. 1962) (reiterating when there
is “a bona fide doubt as to a defendant’s present sanity” before or during trial, a hearing must be held).
192. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–20 (2002) (stressing how the imposition of the
death penalty on a mentally retarded person serves no purpose of our criminal justice system).
193. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
194. Id. at 417–18.
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this position in Atkins v. Virginia,195 which explicitly provides the
imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who is mentally retarded is
unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.196 These cases
demonstrate the delicacy of dealing with defendants like McCoy who are
completely insane and do not understand the nature of their reality. These
defendants do deserve to be punished, but not by death. Defendants like
McCoy typically have gone through extreme trauma and abuse and simply
do not understand what they did was wrong. Research has shown repeatedly
that many capital defendants have extremely brutal pasts which involve
sexual assault, child abuse, drug abuse, verbal and physical abuse, and the
like.197 These individuals typically were once functioning beings who were
steered in the wrong direction by a toxic parent, spouse, or significant other.
Although this does not excuse their behavior, it should be heavily
considered during competency rulings. McCoy now gives these troubled
individuals a constitutional right to insist their attorneys not concede guilt
as to any element of an offense, even in the face of overwhelming evidence
which will certainly convince a reasonable jury they are guilty.198
VI. MCCOY SHOULD HAVE FALLEN UNDER THE SCOPE OF STRICKLAND
The Supreme Court, in McCoy, created a new constitutional right for
capital defendants and disregarded serious mental health issues in the United
States.199 For English, conceding guilt was the only viable option in the

195. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–19 (“Unless the imposition of
the death penalty on a mentally retarded person ‘measurably contributes to one or both of these goals
[of retribution and deterrence], it ‘is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering,’ and hence an unconstitutional punishment.”).
197. See Childhood Trauma Prevalent Among Death Row Inmates, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/childhood-trauma-prevalent-among-death-row-inmates [https://
perma.cc/HHM4-9GSA] (“A majority of Texas death row prisoners who voluntarily responded to a
recent survey . . . reported having experienced abuse or other trauma as children. The survey results
are consistent with the findings of academic studies that have repeatedly documented high rates of
childhood abuse among those sentenced to death.”).
198. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1512 (2018) (“Once [McCoy] communicated that
to court and counsel, strenuously objecting to English’s proposed strategy, a concession of guilt should
have been off the table. The trial court’s allowance of English’s admission of McCoy’s guilt despite
McCoy’s insistent objections was incompatible with the Sixth Amendment.”).
199. See Mental Illness, supra note 180 (describing severely mentally ill capital defendants who are
sometimes so unaware or ill that they waive key trial or appeal rights and effectively volunteer to be
executed); see also J.C. Oleson, Swilling Hemlock: The Legal Ethics of Defending a Client Who Wishes to
Volunteer for Execution, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 147, 154 (2006) (footnote omitted) (“The most
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face of the State’s evidence.200 Additionally, there were many cases in
Louisiana at the time that allowed these concessions for capital crimes.201
All cases were subject to the Strickland test and not viewed under a structural
error standard.202
It is critical to understand conceding guilt to an element of an offense
does not amount to pleading guilty.203 Quite the opposite in fact—take,
for example, a crime with the following elements: (1) the defendant
committed the act, and (2) the defendant intended to commit the act. If
defense counsel argues his client did commit the act (element 1) but did not
intend to (element 2), counsel is not saying the client is guilty.204 Counsel
is admitting the act occurred but is arguing the client is not responsible for
the outcome because the intent was not present. This is precisely what
McCoy’s defense attorney did when he admitted his client killed the victims
but argued he did not have the mental capacity to be guilty of first-degree
murder.205
A. Louisiana Caselaw Views Improper Concessions of Guilt Under the Strickland
Test
In State v. Haynes,206 the defendant was found guilty of first-degree
murder after kidnapping, raping, stabbing, and eventually killing a female
The evidence in the case was
medical student on campus.207
overwhelming.208 The State had the defendant on videotape near the

difficult ethical dilemma that faces capital attorneys may be what to do about the ‘volunteer,’ the client
who wishes to waive his appeals and to expedite his own execution.”).
200. See supra text accompanying note 68.
201. See discussion infra Section VI.A–B.
202. See discussion infra Section VI.A.
203. See, e.g., McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1518 n.1 (“[Counsel’s] strategy was to concede that McCoy
committed the murders and to argue that he should be convicted only of second-degree murder,
because [McCoy’s] ‘mental incapacity prevented him from forming the requisite specific intent to
commit first degree murder.’” (citing State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 570 (La. 2016))).
204. See, e.g., id. at 1516–17 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“What about conceding that a defendant is
guilty, not of the offense charged, but of a lesser included offense? That is what English did in this
case. He admitted that petitioner was guilty of the noncapital offense of second-degree murder in an
effort to prevent a death sentence.”).
205. Id. at 1506 n.1.
206. State v. Haynes, 662 So. 2d 849 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
207. Id. at 850.
208. See id. at 853 (“The State’s evidence was legally sufficient to prove that Haynes was engaged
in one or more of the enumerated felonies in the first degree murder statute.”).
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murder scene shortly before it occurred,209 found the victim’s wallet hidden
in the defendant’s mobile home,210 and found the victim’s blood in the
defendant’s automobile.211 Along with other damning evidence in this case,
it was clear the defendant was guilty.212 In Haynes, defense counsel
conceded guilt over his client’s objection.213 Haynes did not want to admit
to any accusations made by the State and made this clear to the court.214
However, his defense attorney, knowing this strategy would surely lead to
the death penalty, conceded guilt to second-degree murder but argued his
client did not possess the intent needed for first.215
The Fifth Circuit ultimately upheld the lower court’s determination and
properly considered the case under Strickland.216 In doing so, the appellate
court held the State’s evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict
for first-degree murder.217 The court considered the totality of the
evidence and logically concluded: even if the concession was improper, it
did not amount to any prejudice because it was not relied on by the State
and the State had plenty of evidence to support the verdict.218 In the end,
the concession was successful because the jury did not agree on a capital

209. See id. at 851 (“The medical school’s video surveillance system recorded Haynes on
videotape on the ninth floor of the BRI building around the time in question. . . . Haynes’s grandfather,
who was also his supervisor, identified him from the tape.”).
210. Id.
211. See id. at 851 (indicating scientific tests confirmed Haynes was the victim’s rapist.).
212. See id. at 853 (“Based on the totality of the evidence, a reasonable juror could have
concluded that Haynes had committed the aggravated kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery of [the
victim].”).
213. See id. at 850 (“[H]aynes complains of his counsel’s above argument, which was effectively
stated in his counsel’s opening remarks to the jury, conceding Haynes’s guilt of the underlying felonies
relied on by the State for a conviction of first degree felony murder.”).
214. See id. at 852 (“Haynes specifically asserts that he did not want his lawyers to argue that he
was guilty of any of the accusations made by the State.”).
215. See id. at 850 (“Haynes’s counsel argues here . . . that while the evidence may show that
Haynes kidnapped, raped, robbed and cut and stabbed [the victim] with a knife, the evidence does not
negate the reasonable inference of four arguable ways that [the victim] could have fallen to her death
after the other felonies were committed.”).
216. See id. at 853 (“Where the assertion that counsel was ineffective rests on actions of counsel
pertaining to the incident proceedings, the Strickland test is applicable.”).
217. Id.
218. See id. (“Here counsel’s strategy was to persuade the jury against a capital verdict in the
bifurcated proceedings. The State did not rely on defense counsel’s concessions. The State’s evidence
was legally sufficient to prove that Haynes was engaged in one or more of the enumerated
felonies . . . .”).
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verdict and instead sentenced the defendant to life without parole.219
Haynes gives Louisiana the general rule of using the Strickland ineffective
assistance of counsel test when dealing with an attorney who admits guilt
over client objection.220
B. Other Capital Cases in Louisiana Allowed Defense Counsel to Concede Guilt
Over Client Objection
In four other capital cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court permitted
defense counsel to concede their clients’ guilt over an express objection and
used the Strickland test if ineffective assistance of counsel was raised.221
First, in State v. Tucker,222 the defendant was forced to proceed with his
attorney who, over his objection, admitted his guilt to first-degree murder
while arguing for a lesser sentence.223 Next, in State v. Leger,224 the
defendant was given the choice to accept his attorney’s strategy—admit guilt
over his objection—or represent himself.225 Also, in State v. Bridgewater,226
the defendant, who insisted his attorney fight for acquittal, was eventually
told he must accept the strategy of conceding guilt to second-degree
murder.227 Lastly, in State v. Tyler,228 the defendant was forced to proceed
with his trial counsel admitting guilt over his objection.229
Whether right or wrong, English’s strategy to concede guilt over McCoy’s
objection was not novel in the legal field, especially not in Louisiana, where
this was typically the practice when there was overwhelming evidence of
219. See id. (“Whatever the reasons for the jury’s inability to agree on a capital verdict, Haynes’s
counsel succeeded in avoiding the death sentence.”).
220. Brief for The Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and The Promise of
Justice Initiative as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15–16, McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct 1500
(2018) (No. 16-8255) [hereinafter Amicus Brief, McCoy v. Louisiana].
221. Id. at 16–17.
222. State v. Tucker, 181 So. 3d 590 (La. 2015).
223. See id. at 620–21 (“Defendant alleges he did not acquiesce in the decision of defense
counsel to admit guilt of second degree murder and feticide in closing.”); see also Amicus Brief, McCoy
v. Louisiana, supra note 220, at 16 (providing details regarding the facts of State v. Tucker).
224. State v. Leger, 936 So. 2d 108 (La. 2006).
225. Id. at 148–50; see also Amicus Brief, McCoy v. Louisiana, supra note 220, at 16 (providing
details regarding the facts of State v. Leger).
226. State v. Bridgewater, 823 So. 2d 877 (La. 2002).
227. Id. at 895–96; see also Amicus Brief, McCoy v. Louisiana, supra note 220, at 17 (providing
details regarding the facts of State v. Bridgewater).
228. State v. Tyler, 181 So. 3d 678 (La. 2015).
229. See Amicus Brief, McCoy v. Louisiana, supra note 220, at 17 (providing details regarding
the facts of State v. Tyler). See generally Tyler, 181 So. 3d 678; Tyler v. Louisiana, 137 S. Ct. 589 (2016)
(cert. denied).
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guilt. Although it seems counterintuitive, admitting guilt as to an element
of a crime can sometimes be the best way to minimize liability in the face of
overwhelming evidence.230 It can also serve as an essential strategic choice
in a bench trial if the judge is known to be more lenient when a defendant
admits his fault. If the Supreme Court believed the concession of guilt by
English was improper, they should have analyzed it under the scope of
Strickland to determine whether the concession prejudiced McCoy to the
extent where a new trial was necessary.231
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in McCoy v. Louisiana, had an opportunity to consider
heavily litigated and controversial issues, such as the right to withdraw when
the client is going to commit perjury, the duty of candor toward the tribunal,
the issue of competency, and client autonomy.232 The Court failed to do
so, despite the tremendous importance of these issues. Admittedly, some
of these issues need to be considered by the ABA and by individual states,
but the Court failed to remand the case and instead created poor law with
the most extreme facts.233
The Supreme Court erred in holding a client may insist her attorney not
concede guilt as to any element of a crime in the face of overwhelming
evidence.234 Although the client has the right to be the master of her own
defense,235 at some point this must give way to a seasoned attorney’s
professional judgment on what is best for the client’s legal interests.236
Especially in capital trials, defense attorneys should be given maximum
deference in trial strategy decisions.237 In any event, conceding guilt in the
face of overwhelming evidence should not amount to structural error.
Instead, the Supreme Court should have used a standard similar to the one
230. See United States v. Sampson, 820 F. Supp. 2d 202, 227 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2011) (citation
omitted) (“[T]here was a risk that jurors presented with an initial denial of guilt would view skeptically
any later attempt to claim acceptance of responsibility or remorse. Therefore, a plea of not guilty could
have significantly undermined two of the most important mitigating factors available to Sampson.”);
see also In re Pers. Restraint of Elmore, 172 P.3d 335, 346 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (“[Counsel’s] advice
to plead guilty [to a capital crime] was based upon reasonable trial strategy.”).
231. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
232. See generally McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018).
233. Id.
234. See discussion supra Section VI.B.
235. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
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in Strickland and analyzed whether or not the client was prejudiced by his
attorney’s concession or trial strategy.238

238. See discussion supra Part VI.

